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DEPORTATION AS A DENIAL OF SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS
STIMSON BIILITT*
This article considers the basis and limit of the constitutional power
to deport aliens who have become settled residents of the United States.
The Immigration & Nationality Act of 19521 has drawn attention
to the importance of this problem:' Whether there is a denial of sub-
stantive due process of law in the deportation of persons who have
lived here long enough to have lost old roots and grown new ones.'
For one who has settled in America the severity of deportation in
relation to the behavior for which it now may be the penalty, or an
additional penalty, makes it punishment which is cruel though not
unusual.' For a new arrival who is turned around and sent back to
the place from which he came, deportation is no more than an embar-
rassing and disappointing return to his former place and station. But
the expulsion of a permanent settler means a journey to lands no longer,
if ever, known to the uprooted deportee who becomes an alien at his
*Member of the Washington Bar.
166 STAT. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (Supp. 1953), commonly known as
the McCarran-Walter Act.
2 In 1951, the latest year for which figures are available, 13,544 persons were de-
ported, while 673,169 left voluntarily upon threat of deportation proceedings.
3Re distinction see 26 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 451 (1951). The Latin derivation of the word
"exile" is "ex" out of, and "sal" root
4 Banishment was the customary alternative to a death sentence in Athens and in
Rome. 10 ENc. BR=T. 71 (11th ed.); 10. ENc. AmERiCANA 638 (1929 ed.), SEAGLE,
THE QUEST FoR LAW, 233.
"For exile, or transportation is a punishment unknown to the common law; and,
whenever it is now inflicted, it is either by the choice of a criminal himself to escape a
capital punishment, or else by the express direction of some modern act of parliament."
1 BL. Comm. *137.
"Punishment: . And, in case of any treason committed by a female, the judgment
is to be burned alive. But the humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a tacit
consent, an almost general mitigation of such part of these judgments as savor of
torture or cruelty; a sledge or hurdle being usually allowed to such traitors as are
condemned to be drawn, and there being very few instances (and those accidental or
by negligence) of any person's being emboweled or burned till previously deprived of
sensation by strangling. Some punishments consist in exile or banishment, Some,
though rarely, occasion a mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hands or ears;
others fix a lasting stigma on the offender by slitting the nostrils or branding in the
hand or face." 4 Br. Comm. *376.
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destination, no matter what may be his citizenship.5 The penalty
has become more harsh than it was in former times. Now a person may
not be able to return to where he was born. If he can, he may find a
radically altered land.
For the greater part of our history deportation was a device used
little if at all because each added pair of hands was so welcome. Except
for the controversial act of 1798 which granted the President power to
deport aliens whom he deemed "dangerous to the peace and safety of the
United States,"' and which was defended as a war measure and lasted
for two years, the first statute to expel aliens was enacted in 1888 and
provided for expulsion of Chinese contract laborers who had entered
illegally In the last 50 years the limited purpose of implementing the
immigration laws has been extended to use the deportation power as a
device for punishment, for getting rid of socially undersirable persons
and for preserving internal security Gradually the statutes have ex-
tended their scope as well to cover more types of conduct and make
expulsion a penalty for less offensive or dangerous types of undesira-
bility than before.'
Since 1903, aliens whom Congress deemed dangerous to the national
security have been subject to expulsion.' Since 1917, convictions of
certain crimes have constituted grounds for deportation. The thresh-
old for departure was lowered in successive steps by the Alien Registra-
tion Act of 1940 and the Internal Security Act of 1950. Now the
McCarran-Walter Act provides for deportation of aliens whose entry
was legal, who could not have been excluded at that time, and who have
5 "He is as much our product as though his mother had born him on American soil.
He knows no other language, no other people, no other habits, than ours, he will be as
much a stranger in Poland as anyone born of ancestors who immigrated m the seven-
teenth century. However heinous his crimes, deportation is to him exile, a dreadful
punishment, abandoned by the common consent of all civilized peoples. Such, indeed, it
would be to anyone, but to one already proved to be incapable of honest living, a helpless
waif in a strange land, it will be utter destruction." L. Hand for the court, affirming a
deportation order, United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F 2d 630 (C.A. 2nd 1926).
"But this alien has grown to manhood here. To root up all these associations which
we call home, to banish him to be an outcast in a country of whose traditions and habits
he knows nothing, and where his alienage is a daily, living fact, not a legal imputation-
these are consequences whose warrant we may properly scrutinize with some jealousy,
and insist that logic shall not take the place of understanding." L. Hand in United
States ex rel. Mignozzi v. Day, 51 F 2d 1019, 1021 (C.A. 2nd 1931). See § 243 (h),
66 STAT. 216 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h) (Supp. 1953).
6 1 STAT. 570 (1798)
725 STAT. 566 (1888).
8 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. 580, 588, n. 15 (1952) covering develop-
ment to 1940.
9 32 STAT. 1214 (1903).
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been residents for a long period.10 For most grounds, there is no statute
of limitation. A wide discretion has been lodged in the administrators
of the Act. For example, among those liable for deportation is a person
"who at any time after entry has had a purpose to engage in . .
activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest."1 A sub-
stantial number of grounds are retroactive in effect. One who decided to
commit the crime of possessing a sawed-off shotgun, or who entered
the United States on the basis of marriage to an American citizen and
then failed to fulfill her marital agreement "to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General,"'" could not have known at the time that this course
of conduct would later be made the ground for expulsion from the
country.
As a policy, banishment is an obsolete expedient." It was established
in antiquity when leaders who were thought criminal were too danger-
ous to be kept in slavery in open association with other citizens and
subjects."5 It was maintained later during the period between the aboli-
tion of slavery and the establishment of. prisons. 6
Many of the acts, words, associations, conditions and habits which
are grounds for deportation are not crimes and are not labeled crimes,"
but the purposes underlying the deportation statutes are closer to those
found in criminal law enforcement rather than in the regulation of
foreign commerce. As a penal sanction to rid the community of unde-
sirables, deportation has doubtful value. It is an unreliable deterrent to
forbidden conduct. There is no uniformity of misery inflicted, in con-
trast to the xelatively precise measurements of a prison sentence. Con-
ditions of life in other countries vary widely and so do the willingness
1o § 241(a) (4-17), 66 STAT. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1215(a) (4-17) (Supp. 1953).
"1 §§ 212(a) (27) and 241(a) (7), 66 STAT. 184, 205 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)
(27) and 1251(a) (7) (Supp. 1953).
12 241(a) (14), 66 STAT. 207 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (14) (Supp. 1953).
13 § 241 (c), 66 STAT. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (Supp. 1953).
14 E.g. In Australia, aliens with 3 years' residence have complete immunity from
deportation in peacetime.
"Transportation for crime was abolished m England in 1857, but it still survives
among some nations, as Russia, this country maintaining penal settlements in Siberia.
The tendency today, in keeping with advancing civilization, is toward its utter aboli-
tio." 10 ExC. AmERIcANA 638 (1929 ed.).
26 In England, transportation as a punishment was first established by statute m
1597 on the ground that "such rogues as were dangerous to the inferior people should
be banished the realm." 39 ELIZ. c. 4 (Vagrancy).
16 "The British legislature, making a virtue of necessity, discovered that transpor-
tation to the colonies was bound to be attended by various inconveniences, particularly
by depriving the kingdom of many subjects whose labor might be useful to the com-
munity. . The result was an act for the establishment of penitentiary houses,
dated 1778." 8 Ewa. BaR=. 56 (11th ed.).
'7 § 241, 66 STAT. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 1953).
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and capacity for adjustment among persons subject to deportation"8
Deportation is a life sentence. There is no parole board to determine
length of stay according to behaviour and prospects for a law-abiding
life. The elements of deterrence and protection of society are present,
as in modern criminal jurisprudence, but the purpose of rehabilitation
and reform is absent, and its place is taken to some extent by the motive
of revenge. 9
The Act embodies the policy of expelling persons who are innocent
of criminal acts, or ones who have paid their penalty in jail, but who
are "evil types." It even expels former evil types, such as those who
used to have dangerous associations or speak inflamatory words or have
bad habits but have ceased to commit even such venial sins.2" It would
furnish grounds for the deportation of Louis Budenz (former Com-
munist leader), Barney Ross and Stanley Ketchell (former narcotic
addicts) if they were aliens rather than sons of aliens, despite the
fact that they had sworn off their vices. This policy of punishment for
a course of conduct or a moral level rather than for criminal acts strays
from our traditional objective doctrine of guilt for criminal acts and
approaches the subjective procedure of administrative punishment for
bad character.2' The habitual criminal charge is perhaps the nearest
step we have taken toward this theory, and even there the scope is
narow and the penalty is conditioned on specific criminal acts by the
defendant.
The United States is not secured by the dispersal abroad of bad
men. To send subversives, criminals, public charges and other offensive
Is "The convicts [in Australia], or at least large numbers of them, had prospered
exceedingly. Some had incomes of twenty, thirty, even forty thousand pounds a year.
An expedition was sent there [French Guiana], composed of the most evil elements
of the Paris population and numbering 14,000, all of whom died. Other failures are
recorded, the worst being the scheme of the philanthropist Baron Milius, who in 1923
planned to form a community on the banks of the Mana by the marriage of exiled
convicts, and degraded women, which resulted in the most ghastly horrors." 8 ENc.
BaRirr. 58 (11th ed.).
10 HOLMES, THE CoMmoN LAW 41 (23rd ed.).
20 § 241 (a) 6, 11), 66 STAT. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§1251 (a) (6, 11) (Supp. 1953). See text of letter 4/27/53 from Pres. Eisenhower
to Sen. Watkins suggesting consideration of certain proposed changes in Immigration
& Nationality Act of 1952. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1953.
21 Russia provides for banishment of "foreign subjects who are socially dangerous."
Decree of the Central Executive Committee and Council of Peoples Commissars,
USSR, Nov. 5, 1934, [1935] COLLECTION OF LAWS, USSR, no. 11, art. 84. "It is still
difficult to reconcile with traditional Amencan law the jailing of persons by the courts
because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society
from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in tus country and so
fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it." Jackson
as Circuit Justice in Williamson v. United States, 184 F 2d 280, 282 (C.A. 2nd 1950).
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characters to our free allies" does not substantially alter the risk or
burden to our collective security. Some of these persons are regarded
by the Attorney General as so dangerous that it is unsafe to release
them on bail because of the evil they might do. They can harm us in
the same degree almost anywhere in the world. To deport such undesir-
ables merely evades the problem by putting them out of our sight.
It is doubtful whether the strength of the free nations is increased by
substracting from the number of Communists in the United States
where they are a loathsome but politically negligible minority," while
adding to the number in France and Italy where they are a pressing
menace.2' Yet to send scalawags across the Iron Curtain, if and when
possible, would be a generous manpower contribution because only
compatible and competent persons are admitted.25
Of course, the average alien deported under our laws is not the sort
of person who wins awards as a man of dinstinction, or even a good
neighbor. In quality he does not compare with Aristides about whom
the Athenian citizen who voted for his ostracism made the historic
remark- that he was tired of hearing about the man's integrity. But to
the aliens under American jurisdiction the spirit of our laws assures a
standard of justice higher than that which the Greeks saw fit to grant
Socrates. We have an obligation to treat such resident aliens on a level-
of justice close to that dispensed to citizens because, among other rea-
sons, instead of requiring him to become naturalized if he intends to
settle here, we have chosen to permit him to remain indefinitely and "to
become a full-fledged member of the community in which he lives; to
be employed, to own property, to marry and raise a family, to pay
22 "Though this prerogative of exile by conditional pardon is still exercised, it is
likely to create ever-growing difficulties, in consequence of the modem view that a
state ought not to relieve itself of its worst criminals at the expense of other countries.
Our colonies strongly resent the exportation of criminals . and this objection is
shared and expressed by law in the United States." 6 LAw QuART. Rxv. 388, 407(1890).
2s Of course it may be that the importance of espionage and sabotage here is equal
to or greater than abroad, but these are criminal acts from the commission of which we
are given a substantial measure of protection by the penalties which are provided for
citizens and aliens alike.
24 The 4000 Americans who voted in the 1948 Italian elections, largely for the pur-
pose of helping to prevent a Communist victory, thereby lost their American citizenship.
§ 349(a) (5), 66 STAT. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (5) (Supp. 1953), formerly
54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801(e) -(1946). This was restored by special legisla-
tion. § 402(j), 66 STAT. 278 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1435 n. (Supp. 1953), formerly 65 STAT.
191 (1951), 8 U.S.C. § 723 n. (Supp. 1952)
25 See United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 180 (1952).
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taxes, to serve in the armed forces, and otherwise to participate in all
activities save those reserved for citizens, such as voting."2
Nor should a resident alien be thought reprehensible merely for
failure to become naturalized. American citizenship gives much more
in personal security and freedom than it takes by the assignment of
civic duty The rights and privileges of an American citizen are now
more valuable than was even Roman citizenship when Paul invoked it
in his appeal to Caesar."'
It is submitted that the deportation of settled aliens is punishment"
and deprivation of liberty and that it is an unreasonable discrimination
against such aliens as a class.
Deportation as punishment was illustrated last year in the cases of
Hartsades v. Shaughnessy" and Latva v. Nicolls. ° Here aliens were
ordered deported because they had been Communists although they
had not become such until after their settlement in this country and
had ceased to be such before deportation proceedings were commenced.
In the Latva case, the petitioner, after his immigration from Finland
at the age of 13, had lived in the United States for 36 years, had an
American born wife, had two sons who were honorably discharged
veterans of World War II, had belonged to the Commumst Party for
less than 6 months in 1934 and had paid less than $1.00 in dues.
The case of Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei2' is an example of the
proposition that deportation of a settled alien is a deprivation of liberty
In 1897, Ignatz Mezei was born on Gibraltar. He settled in this country
in 1923 and for 25 years followed his trade as a carpenter. He married,
and his children were brought up in the home which he owns m Buffalo.
In 1948 he went abroad to visit his ill mother but was unable to enter
2 8 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
193 (1953). Some states of the United States formerly even used to allow aliens to
vote. 2 U.S. CONG. NEwS '52 1658.
27 AcTs 25:16.
28 "If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been invited as
the asylum most auspicious to his happiness-a country where he may have formed the
most tender connections, where he may have invested his entire property, where
he enjoys, under the laws, a greater share of the blessings of personal security and
personal liberty than he can elsewhere hope for, if a banishment of this sort be not
a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a
doom to which the name can be applied." President James Madison, 4 ELLIOTT, DEB.
555.
29 Note 8 supra. Similar facts and result: Martinez v. Neelly, 197 F. 2d 462 (C.A.
7th 1952), Galvan v. Press, 201 F 24 302 (C.A. 9th 1953), Corona v. Landon, 111 F
Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1953).30 106 F Supp. 658 (D. Mass. 1952). After this case had received national publicity,
the proceedings were arrested by executive decision, a dispensation not of justice but
of mercy.31 ...... U.S ........ 97 L. Ed. (Adv. p. 554) (1953) (5 to 4).
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Rumania where she died. The Immigration & Naturalization Service
at first refused to grant him a visa for his return from Hungary. After
this delay, when he reached New York in January of 1950, the Service
barred his entry. He was alleged to be a security risk on the basis of
information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which was
asserted to be against the public interest. All efforts to effect re-entry
failed. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his discharge on
habeas corpus, 2 but the Supreme Court reversed. Confined without bail,
he remains on Ellis Island.
It is curious that no judge of either appellate court questioned the
refusal by the government to entrust to a Federal Judge (one who a
short time before had exercised his ultimate governmental power to
sentence two spies to death) information in the possession of staff mem-
bers of the Service and the office of the United States Attorney." So
far, Mezei's 25 applications have been rejected by 17 countries and
accepted by none."' Since it is unlikely that the Service would tell the
governments of 17 countries what it was unwilling to tell a United
States Judge in camera, their motive presumably was the natural fear
of admitting someone so dangerous that the omnipotent U.S.A. itself
feared to have him at large.85
The courts considered only the procedural question" -- whether the
defendant came under United States jurisdiction"' so as to be entitled
to a fair hearing without which the 5th Amendment would bar his con-
finement."' Neither court gave weight, in considering this issue, to the
832 United States ex tel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 195 F. 2d 964 (C.A. 2d 1952).
as Even where the judge is taken into confidence, the courts face a current problem
of whether to convict a man on the basis of information which the government main-
tains would impair the national security if made public.
84 New York Times, Apr. 23, 1953, p. 1. See The Commonweal, May 8, 1953, p. 111.85 "This man, who seems to have led a life of unrelieved insignificance, must have
been astonished to find himself suddenly putting the Government of the United States
in such fear that it was afraid to tell him why it was afraid of him." Jackson dissenting
m Shaughnessy v. United States ex tel. Mezei, note 31 srupra at 562.
Be It was taken for granted that the administrative action undertaken met the re-
quirements of substantive due process. Jackson's discussion of substantive due process
applied only to confinement, not deportation, and he concluded even there that detention
would not violate substantive due process. Id. at 563.
87 "It was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the judici-
ary power to act." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1885).
88 See Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908), m which a man excluded
as an alien was granted habeas corpus on denial of a hearing to pass on his claim of
citizenship. Holmes: "It would be difficult to say that he was not imprisoned, theoretic-
ally as well as practically, when to turn him back meant that he must get into a vessel
against his wish and be carried to China. The case would not be that of a person simply
prevented from going in one direction that he desired and had a right to take, all others




fact that the defendant was in fact a resident alien, despite his recent
trip abroad, by reason of the ties developed by his 25 years in the
United States. Both courts adopted the fiction that Mezei was in effect
knocking at the door as a would-be immigrant."9 The Supreme Court
concluded from this that he was not entitled to the protection of the
Constitution." It then adopted a second fiction that the defendant
could be indefinitely confined on Ellis Island without losing his status
as an outsider asking to be admitted. The Second Circuit distinguished
between sending a man in Mezei's position away from the United
States and keeping him on Ellis Island. It held that for the former he
was entitled to a fair hearing while for the latter he was not. In recog-
nition of the close similarity between the two measures, the Supreme
Court applied a uniform rule.
The Second Circuit Court first took the unrealistic but technically
correct position that the defendant was an outsider requesting admis-
sion. Then it took the realistic but logically questionable position that
even such an applicant may be entitled to constitutional protection.
In its decision it used in succession the two meanings of the word
"power" in its statement, the purported basis of its decision, that "the
power to hold can never be broader than the power to remove or shut
out."'" The first time the Court means authority or right; the second
time it means practical capacity The apparent rationale of the Court
was: Confinement should only be a means to an end, which is deporta-
tion, 2 if deportation is practically impossible confinement becomes a
substituted end, although deportation is not punishment, confinement
is, so it should be protected by procedural safeguards of a fair hearing,
to which any person within United States control is entitled.
It might be claimed that the decision would admit a multitude of
stateless vagrants if it is based merely on the fact that the defendant
39 The Supreme Court distinguished the case on the facts from Kwong Hal Chew
v. Colding . ..... U.S ......., 97 L. Ed. (Adv. p. 348) (1953), decided the month before,
where a Chinese seaman who had shipped out from this country on an American ship
and had been detained and denied permission to land on return from the voyage was
deemed a resident alien and thus entitled to a release from confinement unless he was
granted a hearing under the 5th Amendment.
40 In this, the Court followed the dissent of Learned Hand below. Accord in holding
that a temporarily landed alien is constructively outside the United States so that he
cannot invoke the Constitution. The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher),
189 U.S. 86 (1903), United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292
(1904), United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905), Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537 (1950). Cf. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 229, 230 (1925).
41 United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, note 32 supra at 967.
42 Id. at 968.
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was here, rather than on the ties developed in prior years of residence.'8
Whether or not the Court unconsciously recognized defendant's prior
residence as an essential element of the decision, the problem may be
expected to arise only when persons such as Mr. Mezei, who have their
roots embedded here, seek entry.
The distinction drawn by the Second Circuit Court between deporta-
tion and confinement (when it is a substitute, rather than a means, for
deportation) rests on the assumption that confinement is more severe
punishment than deportation and may not be done on the same condi-
tions. In light of the facts of the case before it the decision takes the
absurd position of leaving at large aliens so sinister or offensive that no
land will take them, while expelling the more innocuous ones.14
Neither court had to pass on the validity of a statute deporting a
person for acts not amounting to a crime and for which a citizen
suffers no penalty. The Second Circuit Court released the defendant
because he had no hearing. The Supreme Court held that the man
was merely an excluded outsider who had no claim to constitutional
protection. Both the facts of the case and the rationale of the decisions,
however, demonstrate the close comparison between the penalties of
deportation and of imprisonment.
The unreasonable discrimination against settled aliens as a class is
illustrated by a comparison betwen the cases of Carlson v. Landon"
and Stack v. Boyle." In the Carlson case the Court, in implicit recog-
nition of the equivalence of the power to deport and the power to jail,
upheld the decision to hold without bail alien members of the Com-
munist Party pending deportation proceedings. Under the Act the grant
of bail in such cases is within the discretion of the Attorney General.
The deportation power is used to imprison aliens believed to be dan-
gerous to the nation, although citizens are exempt from such treat-
ment.'7 In the Carlson case the petitioners were neither leaders nor
accused of crime. In the Stack case, by contrast, citizens who were
Communist leaders accused of crime were not only granted bail but
also were protected from the imposition of excessive bail under the
8th Amendment, even though there was reason to believe that some of
4FSe 66 HARv. L. RFv. 643, n. 258 (1953).
44 The statute and the Supreme Court's decision take the more consistent positions.
An alien ordered deported who is unable to make his way into any other country may,
within the discretion of the Attorney General, be confined indefinitely. § 242(c), 66
STAT. 209 (1952), 8 u.s.c. § 1252(c) (Supp. 1953).
45 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
46342 U.S. 1 (1951).
47 It is hard to see how a denial of any bail can conform to the 8th Amendment's
prohibition of "excessive bail."
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them might leave the country, not a problem in the Carlson case. The
two -cases can be logically reconciled only because they proceed from
premises which should not be, but are, different. The same contrasting
results take place in the less sensational instances of men who have
served their time for certain crimes. Citizens go free, and aliens are
sent abroad.
It is ureasonable discrimination for those who as "persons" are
entitled to the protection of most of the Constitution, and in established
practice are assured freedom of economic activity, 8 to be coerced to
forego the exercise of some of their constitutional social and political
rights"' by the threat of confinement followed by banishment.
The problem is not one of constitutional rights of all aliens or of
whether settled aliens have acquired anything in the nature of prescrip-
tive rights but rather the constitutional limits upon the power of gov-
ernment to act in this field."0 Of course Congress has power to impose
certain conditions on aliens. The question is at what point does the
severity of the terms transgress the Constitution. It is submitted that
the deportation of a settled alien is a denial of liberty without due pro-
cess of law and as such a violation of the 5th Amendment.
No attempt will be made here to consider what conditions could or
should be imposed on transients or sojourners. If deportation of settlers
is barred, there need be no inquiry into the problems of retroactive
legislation, double jeopardy, procedural due process5 and the trial
protections of the 6th and 7th Amendments.
Except for Hartszades v. Shaughnessy, the substantive due process
question has not been squarely considered. The Chinese Exclusion
Case2 and Fong Yue Ting v. U.S."3 are the two landmarks from which
the later deportation cases draw their authority In the former, a Chi-
nese contract laborer who had lived in the United States was excluded
on his attempted return in 1889 under the act of the preceding year.
48 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (fishing),
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, note 37 supra (laundry), Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)
(restaurant employment).
49 § 241(a) (6) (A,B,D,FG), 66 STAT. 204 (1952), 8 u.s.c. § 1251(a) (6)
(A,B,D,F,G) (Supp. 1953). The Court has pointed out that aliens are protected by the
1st-Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) and 5th Amendments-United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942), Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951).
50 See Nishimura Eklu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892), The Japanese
Immigrant Case, note 40 supra at 100; Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
51 Examined in 66 HAnv. L. Rav. 643 (1953).
52 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
53 149 U.S. 697 (1893).
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The due process question was not raised or considered, and the case
did not even concern deportation. The Court rejected petitioner's two
grounds of objection: That the exclusion act was invalid because it im-
paired the prior treaty between the U.S. and China which gave peti-
tioner the right of residence in the U.S., and that Congress lacked the
power to exclude aliens who formerly resided in this country The first
contention was met by the statement that, "The treaties were of no
greater legal obligation than the Act of Congress. By the Constitution
laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the authority
of the United States are both declared to be the supreme law of the land,
and no paramount authority is given to one over the other.., the last
expression of the sovereign will must control."
The second contention was answered by quoting from John Marshall
in The Exchange v. McFaddon: "The jurisdiction of the nation within
its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible
of no limitation not imposed by itself."'"
That is, the Court based the exclusion power on the inherent powers
of national sovereignty, declaring that it was absolute as to other
nations or as to applicant foreigners. Nothing was said regarding Con-
stitutional limitations on the exercise of such a power.
In the Fong Yue Ting case, decided four years later, the Court by 5
to 3 upheld the expulsion of Chinese laborers who were held to have
entered the country illegally. At issue was the fairness, as applied to
petitioners, of certain evidentary rules in the expulsion statute which
put a heavy burden on the alien to prove the legality of his presence
here. The majority recognized that even if aliens have no rights the
expulsion power is subject to the limits of the Constitution 5 but con-
cluded that these limits had not been exceeded by the expulsion of
illegally entered sojourners or by the statutory rules of proof. The
majority went on, however, to proclaim in repeated dicta that the
power to expel was unlimited and that it was as absolute as the exclu-
sion power with which the majority equated it.5" It rested its position
on the authority of The Chinese Exclusion Case and statements by
commentators on international law. The ground for dissent was that
the evidentiary rules denied the petitioners the procedural due process
of a fair hearing to which they were entitled as persons under American
547 Cranch 116, 136 (1812).
55Fong Yue Ting v. United States, note 53 supra at'713.86Id. at 707, 713, 724, 728.
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jurisdiction. Yet the dissenting opinions gave an exaggerated signifi-
cance to the majority dicta by the intensity of their disagreement with
them. The impression was created that the case held that the power
to expel was absolute.
Succeeding cases, ignoring both the actual decisions of these two and
also the expressed recognition in their opinions of the existence of
constitutional limits, have treated as controlling these dicta and what
the Fong Yue Ting majority said The Chinese Exclusion Case held.
These later cases are not persuasive on the substantive due process
question, but their opinions have built up a boot-strap accumulation
of dicta"' which lacks weight because it neither stems from nor itself
represents actual holdings. Due to this sustained series,"' the issue of
substantive due process has not even been pushed, much less consid-
ered, in most recent cases the opinions of which invoke the two authori-
ties with a transient and casual genuflection.
Thus no restriction has been imposed upon the power of Congress
to deport."' Even the dissenting opinions have been concerned only with
procedural fairness. Among the decisions before Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, the case of Bugajewitz v. Adams,8 0 upholding the deportation of
a prostitute, comes closer than any other to a holding that no restriction
can be imposed. Citing Fong Yue Ting, the Court said: "Congress has
power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country
it deems hurtful."'" In view of the length of her stay (5 years), her
lack of family and preoccupation and universality of her profession it
57 Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 545 (1895) (exclusion case),
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 231 (1896) (whether alien may be
imprisoned by administrative discretion), Li Sing v. United States., 180 U.S. 486,
495 (1901) (exclusion case), Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302
(1902) (privilege of transit through U.S. territory), Japanese Immigrant Case, note
40 supra at 97, United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, note 40 supra at 289 (an
Irish anarchist, represented by Edgar Lee Masters and Clarence Darrow), Johannes-
sen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (denaturalization case), Zakonaite v. Wolfe, 226
U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (procedural question) , Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 556 (1913)
(summary executive deportation from the Philippines) , Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228
U.S. 585, 591 (1913) , Lapma v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914) (fraudulent entry),
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (war powers).
58 "By their very vastness, the themes to be translated into law lend themselves too
readily to the innocent deceptions of rhetoric." Poulos v. New Hampshire,-U.S.-,
97 L. Ed. (Adv. p. 702, 713) (1953).
59 Exception. Congress appears to assume that the Bill of Attainder provision
applies to deportation. In 1940 a bill (H.R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.) to deport
Harry Bridges was passed by the House but got no further, perhaps for the reason
that it was expected that the Supreme Court would invalidate it. See United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
60 Note 57 supra.
81 Id. at 591.
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is doubtful that she had become a rooted settler. Futhermore, the
constitutional issue raised by her counsel and passed upon by the Court
was the procedural due process question of whether she was entitled
to a judicial trial rather than a mere administrative determination. The
reasons for this uniform series of dicta have been the imaginary pre-
cedents of The Chinese Exclusion and Fong Yue Ting cases, the
precedents of succeeding opinions based upon the former ones and
the rationale of the Fong Yue Ting dicta which appealed as well to later
members of the Court. 2
Until 1904, the expulsion of aliens for any purpose other than to
implement immigration policy, that is, to enforce the exclusion laws,
had never been considered by the courts or, except for the short-lived
statute of 1798, required by Congress. The sweeping language which
equated the powers to exclude and to expel" is more understandable
when read in the light of the then exclusive concern with apprehending
and deporting aliens who had recently and illegally entered. During
those formative years the Court was not called on to consider the
problem of the undesirable settled alien whose entry and residence
were legal.
Another significant element in the two landmark cases was an
insistance on unrestricted power as an attribute of American sover-
eignty under international law.6" This fact does not in itself overcome
the self-imposed inhibitions of our own Constitution. The power is
recognized by nations as one that exists as between them; Canada may
deport some one, but California may not.
A third factor in the dicta was the expressed fear of restricting the
62 A rationale used in some of the later cases is that of an implied contract between
the immigrant and the natives, whose ancestors preceded-him to this country (cf. FDR's
salute to the DAR as "fellow mnivants," Time Magazine, May 4, 1953), by which
terms are imposed on the alien who submits to them as a condition of lus residence.
Li Sing v. United States, note 57 supra at 495, Pearon v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281,
284 (1906), Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 467 (1912), Zakonaite v. Wolfe,
note 57 supra at 275; Lapma v. Williams, note 57 supra at 88, In re Kosopud, 272 F.
330, 333 (N.D. Ohio 1920), rejected in United States v. Sin Joy, 240 F. 392, 393
(C.A. 9th 1917) ; See 35 CoL L. Rxv. 321. Aside from the constitutional limits to the
conditions which the United States could impose, if such agreements-a conception
which smacks of indentured servitude-were to be held to exist, a whole separate
system of law could be established. See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 148
(1909) ; Oceanic Steam Navig. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 340 (1909) (This
supposition rejected).
63 The two powers in fact tend to equate only in the narrow field of substantive,
not procedural, due process for the implementation of immigration laws in respect to
sojourners.64 Nishimura Eklu v. United States, note 50 supra at 659; Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, note 53 supra; Wong Wing v. United States, note 57 supra at 231, Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, note 8 supra, n. 14 at 588.
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country's freedom to act in foreign affairs-fear of interference with
the executive and legislative branches in their conduct of war and peace
with other nations. In 1893, the Court understandably felt it a simple
matter to refrain from interference with the conduct of foreign rela-
tions. At that time it was not hard to distinguish between the foreign
and domesic functions, and it was possible to discover matters in one
sphere which but slightly touched the other. Those days are gone. The
foreign and domestic realms have become so mingled that few govern-
mental functions are not ones "affecting international relations." '
Furthermore, this matter even then was not exclusively one of foreign
affairs. The expulsion power is farther from the conduct of foreign
affairs than is the exclusion power, yet even exclusion, though some-
times affected in operation by regulatory treaties, is primarily a domes-
tic concern and motivated by such factors as the labor market and
wishes of resident nationality groups as distinguished from matters
primarily of international concern such as security and trade.
In other cases the Court has recognized that all matters which bear
on personal rights protected by the Constitution are subject to its
limitations; official authority is not a license of unfettered discretion
simply because it may be largely concerned with foreign relations."
Procedural due process may be confined for examination, but sub-
stantive due process seems to mean "justice," and speculation on the
meaning of this difficult word ' easily carries one away into misty
conceptions of fireside philosophy Substantive due process, in a
case not covered by the plain commands of some other provision of the
Bill of Rights," seems to be a kind of constitutional equity which, in
comparison to "common law" equity, is based more on rationality and
common sense than on morals.
The main ground for a denial of substantive due process in the
exercise of the deportation power is the arbitrary preference for the
65 The position of the Court in view of these tendencies has become more unrealistic
as it continues to cleave to its hands-off attitude. It seems to compare the problem
with that of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936),
which concerned conrol of arms shipments to warring foreign nations.
68 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), Cherokee Tobacco v. United
States, 11 Wall. 616 (1871), Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 271 (1898) In re Dillon,
7 Fed. Cas. 710, 711 (1854), See United States v. Trumbull, 48 F 94, 97 (S.D. Cal.
1891).
67 BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 183, NEW HOPES FOR
A CHANGING WORLD 80, AUTHORITY & THE INDIVIDUAL 156, GOSPEL, ST. JOHN, 18:38;
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-172, 176, 177 (1952).
68 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943),
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 269 (1952) (dissent).
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natural born among persons all of whom have acquired roots in the
United States as a result of permanent residence. This class discrimin-
ation without a rational basis is a denial to deep-rooted aliens of the
equal protection of our laws.s
Although the Court has observed that the Federal Government is
not bound by an equal protection clause, 0 it may nevertheless be
suggested that just as the 1st Amendment has come to be held embodied
among the elements of due process under the 14th Amendment,"' so
by a reciprocal connection, the Equal Protection clause of the 14th
is an element of substantive due process under the 5th.'"
Since it is an established constitutional principle that the first eight
Amendments do not apply to the acts of the states because they forbid
only the abridgement by the United States of the enumerated rights
which they contain, 8 the extension of the 1st Amendment to limit state
power is a more drastic step than to read the Equal Protection clause
into the Due Process clause of the 5th."' By the latter, the United
States would restrict its own powers and tend to harmonize its amend-
ments. The 14th Amendment authorizes Congress to enact legislation
to enforce the prohibition of a state's denial of equal protection. It
should follow that it would be inhibited from doing itself what it is
expressly authorized to prevent states from doing. The Supreme Court
often tests the validity of federal legislation as to discrimination and
69 The Equal Protection clause applies to an unreasonable discrimnation against
aliens as a class. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, note 37 supra; Truax v. Raich, note 48 supra;
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, note 48 siupra; Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633 (1948).T0 Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) ; Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100(1943) (Both the policy of the Japanese Evacuation and this decision which upheld
it were made in the heat of war and since have been generally repudiated.)
1 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 672 (1925), Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 362, 373 (1927) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ; Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
364 (1937) ; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939), Minersville School District
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
570 (1942) ; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943) ; Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 349 (1946), Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) ; Hughes
v. Super. Ct. of Calif., 339 U.S. 460, 462 (1950); Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306,
309 (1952) ; Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952) ; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, - U.S. -, 97 L. Ed. (Adv. p. 95, 100) (1952) ; Fowler v. Rhode Island, -
U.S. -- , 97 L. Ed. (Adv. p. 491, 493) (1953).
72 ccord: United States v. Yount, 267 F 861, 863 (W. D. Penn. 1920) ; Sims v.
Rives, 84 F 2d. 871, 878 (C.A. D.C. 1936), cert. den. 298 U.S. 682 (1936) ; See Rochin
v. Calif., note 67 supra at 179.
7T Games v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908) ; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (1847), Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833).
74 See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947).
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classification under the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment by
the same rules of equality that are employed to test the validity of
state legislation under the Equal Protection clause of the 14th.'5
Even if equal protection be not formaly recognized as an element of
due process under the 5th Amendment there still may be a violation of
due process by the discriminatory statutes under discussion. It has
been repeatedly held that despite the absence of an equal protection
clause to check Congress, discriminatory Federal legislation may be
so arbitrary and injurious as to be invalid as a violation of the Due
Process clause."
The degree of liberty represented by a chance to remain under
jurisdiction which assures the protection of the whole Constitution, plus
the lead in the atomic weapons race, is at least comparable in impor-
tance to the freedoms guaranteed by the 1st Amendment; it may be
that the absence of a presumption of constitutionality should likewise
apply to it."
Despite its long and consistent series of decisions in this field the
Court has shown itself not unwilling to change its position on a closely
related point. In the case of Girouard v. United States,"' it over-ruled
the prior cases 9 on the question of whether a refusal to swear an oath
to bear arms for the United States was a bar to becoming a naturalized
citizen. Although this was only a question of statutory construction,
75 District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 150 (1909), NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937).
78 Detroit Bank v. United States, note 70 supra at 338, Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, note 70 supra at 585, "Arbitrary discrimination between persons in similar
circumstances would violate the due process clause." Wallace v. Curnn, 95 F 2d 856,
867 (C.A. 4th 1938).
7 Re 1st Amendment: Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526, 559 (1951)
(concurring), United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948), Saza v. New York,
334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948), Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944), Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
115 (1943), Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 97 (1940), Schneider v. Irvingt6i,
308 U.S. 147, I- (1939), "There may be narrower scope for operation of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments. See
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 370; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 542."
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
78 329 U.S. 61 (1946).
79 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605 (1931), United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931), in reversing its
position the Court also disregarded 16 years of implied approval by Congress.
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the Court may see fit as well to shift its stand on this issue of a consti-
tutional validity."0
If the Constitution is to be a bar to the deportation of any settled
alien, fraudulent entry should be made a crime punished by imprison-
ment. Whether a person should be deported upon his release from
prison would depend upon whether he had become settled at the time
of his conviction. Such persons assumed the risk. They entered knowing
they were doing wrong and exposing themselves to punishment. The
classification is reasonable because they are punished for acts done
as aliens so that the penalty is not discriminatory.
The distinction between persons with roots in this country and those
without must be arbitrary. To increase the certainty of the law and
to ease the burden of responsibility on the courts the line should be
drawn by Congress."' The courts will have difficulty enough in its appli-
cation, but in the absence of such a statutory definition they have the
obligation to draw the line both in general and in particular. This per-
plexing problem of evidence of permanent residence might be avoided
by a Congressional requirement that all aliens make prompt applica-
tion for citizenship as a condition of permanent residence and that
failure to obtain citizenship subjects one to deportation.
Deportation is a halfway measure applied to persons who have not
committed a crime yet are dangerous or offensive or a burden on the
s "This Court, unlike the House of Lords, has from the beginning rejected a
doctrine of disability at self-correction." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121(1940). "Stare decisis certainly does not require a court to perpetuate a wrong for
which it was responsible, especially when no rights have accrued in reliance on the
error." Murphy dissenting in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 141 28 (1946).81 There are dicta which remark on the hardship which deportation often causes:
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, note 53 jupra at 740 and 759 (dissents)-court did
not disagree on this point; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922), Mahler
v. Eby, note 57 supra at 39; United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, note 5 supra, United
States ex rel. Mignozzi v. Day, note 5 supra; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154,
164 (1945) (concurring), Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222, n. 8 (1946) ;
DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F. 2d 878, 879 (C.A. 2nd 1947) ; Delgadillo v. Carmichael,
332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Car-
michael v. Delaney, 170 F 2d 239, 245 (C.A. 9th 1948) ; Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. 601, 616 (1949) (concurring); Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F. 2d 391, 400(C.A. 9th 1949); United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521,
33 (1950) (dissent) ; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, note 8 supra'at 600 (dissent). But
there has been no recognition by the Court (as to substantive due process) (See: The
Venus, 8 Cranch 253 (1814) ; The Chinese Exclusion case, note 52 supra; Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, note 53 supra, dissent at 734; The Japanese Immigrant Case,
note 40 supra at 100--all either procedural due process or not concerned with deporta-
tion) of a distinction between aliens who have acquired roots here (See 51 COL. L.
R-v. 606, 638 (1951)), and those recent arrivals who have not. (Cf. Hughes v.
Tropello, 296 F 306 (C.A. 3rd 1925), where, on the issue of burden of proof, the
Court distinguished between those who had entered illegally and those who had done
something after arrival to forfeit their right to remain.)
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community The interest of liberty as well as justice might be served
by other halfway measures-exposure, surveillance, treatment, con-
finement other than prison-to apply to citizens and aliens alike who
fall in this huddle ground of subjection to administrative action.
To put citizens and long-resident aliens on an equal basis would not
"deprive our own Government of a power of defense and reprisal
without obtaining for American citizens abroad any reciprocal privi-
leges or immunities."82 The United States could demand similar treat-
ment for its citizens on conditions of the exclusion power. This policy
was not initiated as a reprisal. Our international bargaining power is
more likely to be enhanced than impaired by a measure which tends
to dispel the impression abroad that the Statue of Liberty is an ambigu-
ous or hypocritical symbol."
The doctrine that an alien knocking at our gates has no rights or
very few has been insensibly extended to a long-resident alien who
has put down roots here."' An alien in this country lives under the
shadow or merciless retribution for the sins of his youth and for those
of his old age ahead. A blind provinciality expects other nations to
accept from us the unwelcome gift of saboteurs, gangsters, prostitutes
and beggars whom we ourselves would not have admitted if at the time
of their entry we could have discerned their nature and predicted their
future conduct. After a man has resided here for awhile he tends to
become our responsibility It is unjust to punish such persons so much
more harshly than the natives, and unjust to other countries to inflict
upon them those undesirables who are in part a product of American
life.
82 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, note 8 supra at 591.
83 Re importance of our practices in this field in their effect on the success of our
foreign policy, see REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION 47-55 (1953).
84 See O'Brian, NEw ENCROACHMENTS ON INDIVIDUALo FREEDOM, 66 HARv. L. REv
1, 19 (1953).
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